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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises from a dispute over competing claims of title to portions of certain 
riparian and agricultural land in Bingham County, Idaho. Judgment was entered quieting title to 
all but .34 acres of the disputed portions in the names of the purchasers of record title. Judgment 
based upon resulting trust was entered granting title to the .34 acres together with an easement 
for a center pivot and an easement for a mainline in the names of claimants of title through an 
umecorded contract for sale. Following a supplemental trial, judgment was granted resulting in 
conveyance of title to .32 acres owned by the claimants of title to the purchasers. This appeal 
followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
The Plaintiff/Respondents, Craig Peterson and Janice Peterson (the Petersons), restate the 
salient facts. 
Identity of Parties 
Craig Peterson and Janice Peterson are husband and wife. The Petersons are the 
Plaintiffs/Respondents. (Clerk's Record, pp. 15 and 605). 
The Defendants/Third-party Plaintiffs/Appellants are Wesley Gentillon and Connie 
Gentillon, husband and wife, and Lamon (Mont) Gentillon and Lori Faye Gentillon, husband and 
wife. (Clerk's Record, pp. 22, 611). They form a family partnership referred to in the distlict 
court below and in this brief as the Partnership. (Clerk's Record, pp. 666). 
The Third-party Defendants/Cross Appellants are Marcel Gentillon and Doris Gentillon, 
husband and wife (the Gentillons). (Clerk's Record, pp. 45 and 629). They are respectively 
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uncle and aunt to Wesley Gentillon and Lamon Gentillon. (Transcript, p. 118). Additional Third-
party Defendants are Scott Gentillon and Tracy Gentillon. (Clerk's Record p. 44; 45 and 629). At 
the times relevant to the issues in this appeal, Scott and Tracy were husband and wife, but since 
have been divorced. Although Tracy Gentillon did not appear at either the initial trial or the 
supplemental trial, the court's amended final judgment resolved all issues raised in her answer. 
Orientation of Subject Property 
The property that is the subject of this action is riparian and agricultural land with 
coterminous boundaries situated in Sections 19 and 24, Township 1 South, Range 37 East Boise 
Meridian. (Clerk's Record, pp. 666). Below is an illustration of the subject property taken from a 
trial exhibit. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). 
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Since 1956, the Gentillons lived in the house depicted on the illustration. (Transcript, pp. 
8-11; 16-17; 424). That house was situated 820 feet west of the NE comer of Section 24 and 
about 50 feet south of the northern section line of Section 24. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 8). The 
Gentillons were the common owners and predecessors in interest of the farmland illustrated in 
Section 24 (farmland) together with the riparian land described as BLM Lot 1, Section 19 (Lot 
1). (Transcript, pp. 8-11; 116-17; 26-28). The eastern boundary of Lot 1 is the sinuous line of the 
west bank of the Snake River. 
In addition, the Gentillons held title to and maintained an access road running along the 
north section line of Section 24 fi'om their house to a county road to the west. (Transcript, pp. 
35-36). Finally, pertinent to the issues in this appeal, the Gentillons owned a triangular shaped 
parcel of riparian land (Lot 16) in Section 24 consisting of approximately 1.84 acres and situated 
on the west bank of the Snake River with its northern apex angle common to the southern apex 
angle of Lot 1. (Transcript, pp. 16-17; 26-28). 
Hist01Y of Transactions Between the Gentillons and Their Son. 
Sometime in 1991 the Gentillons were facing the prospect of foreclosure of their 
property. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, p. 426). To avert foreclosure, they agreed to sell 
their farmland in Section 24 and their riparian land in Section 19 to their son, Scott Gentillon and 
his then wife, Tracy. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 16-17; 42-45; 426-427). As part 
of that transaction, the FHA caused a survey to be performed for the purpose of identifying the 
farmland to be sold to Scott and the home lot reserved by the Gentillons. (Clerk's Record, p. 
666); (Transcript, p. 426). Inexplicably, the legal descriptions for the fannland and the home lot 
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produced by that survey bisected the Gentillons' home. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, p. 
426-427). The Gentillons were unaware of that description enor. (Clerk's Record,p 666); 
(Transcript, p. 426-428). The FHA survey was never recorded. (Transcript, p. 426-428). 
The farmland sold to Scott consisted of approximately 58 acres in Section 24. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 16-17; 26-28; 42-45). The home lot reserved to the Gentillons 
consisted of approximately 10 acres and was identified as tax parcel T -10032. (Clerk's Record, 
p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 51-52). The eastern boundary of the home lot abutted Lot 1. Lot 1 
consists of approximately 1.6 acres. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); 
Following the FHA survey, the Gentillons executed a wananty deed conveying the 
farmland, including Lot 1, to Scott and reserving the home lot. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 6). The same deed reserved to the Gentillons title to their access road. The 
Gentillons retained title to Lot 16. (Transcript, pp. 25-26); (Plaintiffs Exhibit 6). 
From the sale to their son until September 2006, the Gentillons continuously resided in 
their home on the home lot. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 16-17; 26-28; 42-45; 426-
428). They likewise continuously occupied, possessed, and used the home lot and the access 
road. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 16-17; 26-28; 42-45; 426-428). 
History of the Transaction Between the Gentillolls and the Partnership 
By written agreement dated December 18, 1998 the Gentillons together with their son, 
Scott, entered into a written agreement (Agreement) for exchange of property with the 
Partnership. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Defendants Exhibit A). 
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Under the tenns of the Agreement, Scott Gentillon agreed to sell his fann in Section 24 
and another parcel identified as T-5548 to the Partnership. Scott Gentillon further agreed to 
convey Lot 1 to the Gentillons. The Gentillons agreed to deed the PaIinership a portion of the 
home lot and Lot 1 as follows. 
3. Marcel agrees to exchange with Wes and Mont the land from the SW 
comer of T-10032 necessary to install a Pivot for irrigation of Scott's Fann for 
land east of the pivot contiguous to Parcel T -10032, least disruptive to fanning 
patterns on the retained portion of Scott's Fann. 
4. If survey shows that the fannable acreage in Lot 16 is more than 10% less 
than the fannable acreage in Lot 1, Marcel agree (sic) to deed to Wes and Mont 
land to adjust the new south boundary in Lot 1 (by moving a line parallel to the 
south line of T-10032 north or south) so that the farmable acreage in Marcel's 
retained pOliion of Lot 1 equals the fannable acreage in Section 16 (sic). 
(Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Defendants' Exhibit A). 
Accordingly, adjustments to the Gentillons' Lot 1 and the Partnership's Section 24 
fannland were contemplated by the Agreement. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Defendants' Exhibit 
A). Those two adjustments were contingent upon detennination of farmable acreage and the land 
"necessary to install a Pivot". (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Defendants' Exhibit A). 
Under paragraph 3, the following exchange of land between the Gentillons and the 
Partnership was planned. (Defendants' Exhibit A). Detennined by the amount of land on the 
home lot the Gentillons would deed to the Partnership necessary for movement of the pivot, the 
Partnership in tum would deed to the Gentillons land east of the pivot and contiguous to the 
home lot "least disruptive to fanning patterns". (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Defendants' Exhibit 
A). 
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Under paragraph 4, the following exchange of land between the Gentillons and the 
Pminership was planned. (Defendants' Exhibit A). Depending upon a mathematical computation 
of farmable acreage in Lot 16, the south boundary of Lot 1 would be adjusted north or south of 
the extension of the southern boundary of the home lot. (Transcript, pp. 195-210); (Defendants' 
Exhibit A). 
Neither of the contemplated adjustments was made. (Transcript, pp. 195-210). Nor did 
the Partnership make the required mathematical computation of fannable acreage in Lot 16. 
(Transcript, pp. 209-210). 
In accordance with the Agreement, the Gentillons by warranty deeds recorded December 
31, 1998 as Instrument Nos. 472877 and 472878 conveyed to Scott Gentillon, among other real 
property, the farmland in Section 24 and Lot 16. Scott Gentillon by warranty deed recorded 
December 31, 1998 as Instrument No. 472879 conveyed to the Gentillons Lot 1. Scott Gentillon 
by warranty deed recorded December 31, 1998 as Instrument No. 472880 conveyed to the 
Partnership, among other real property, the farmland in Section 24 and Lot 16. (Clerk's Record, 
p. 666); (Defendants' Exhibits E, G, I). 
Darren Leavitt performed a survey of the farmland, home lot and Lot 1 in early 1999. The 
purpose of Leavitt's survey was to project as near as possible the proposed area of impact for the 
Partnership's planned center pivot. In addition, Leavitt desclibed a parcel consisting of 
approximately .33 acres (garden spot) adjacent to the northwestern boundary of the home lot to 
be exchanged to the Gentillons. An exchange of the garden spot would have solved the problem 
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of the Gentillons' house being bisected on the boundary line. Leavitt's survey was not recorded. 
(Leavitt Deposition, pp. 57); (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 140-142; 433-437). 
The 1998 Agreement did not reference the garden spot. (Transcript, p. 208); 
(Defendants' Exhibit A). The Partnership acknowledged that Leavitt's survey disclosed the 
Gentillons' home was bisected by the common boundary of the home lot and the farmland. 
(Transcript, pp. 141; 201; 435-436). The Partnership agreed that title to the garden spot should 
be conveyed to the Gentillons. (Transcript, pp. 141; 201; 435-436). 
No further action was taken by the Gentillons or the Partnership to finalize the 
contemplated adjustments to the SW corner of the home lot, the farmland, and Lot 1. 
(Transcript, pp. 195-210). 
Since 1992, the Partnership as tenants under Scott Gentillon had been in possession of the 
farmland in Section 24. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 121; 132-133; 174-177). In 
accordance with the 1998 Agreement, the Partnership received title to the farmland in 1998. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 121; 132-133; 174-177); (Defendants' Exhibits E, G, 
I). 
Sometime in 2004 the Partnership installed a center pivot on its farmland. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 146-147). The center pivot in its usual course crosses in an arc 
the remote SW corner of the home lot, impacting an area comprising approximately .34 acres. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 146-147). The Partnership continuously used the pivot 
from 2004 through 2006. (Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 146-147). 
Respondents Brief - Page 8 
7246-PE [appeal] 
History of the Transaction betweell the Petersolls and the Gentillolls 
Responding to information that the Gentillons intended to sell the home lot and Lot 1, in 
September 2006 the Petersons spoke with the Gentillons. (Transcript, pp. 73-75). Based -upon 
their discussions and after viewing the land, the Petersons ordered a title commitment. 
(Transcript, pp. 78-79); (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). 
The title commitment revealed fee simple ownership of the home lot and Lot 1 vested in 
the Gentillons subject to an easement in favor of Utah Power and an existing deed of trust. 
(Transcript, pp. 79-80); (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). No title, interest, or encumbrance in favor of the 
Partnership appeared in the title commitment. (Transcript, pp. 79-80); (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3). 
The Petersons met the Gentillons at the home lot sometime prior to September 14, 2006. 
(Transcript, pp. 73-74). Marcel represented that his land, consisting of the home lot and Lot 1, 
comprised about 13 acres. (Transcript, pp. 32-33; 80-82). Marcel did not disclose the 1998 
agreement with the Partnership. (Transcript, pp. 32-33; 79-80). Nor did Marcel disclose Leavitt's 
1999 survey. (Transcript, pp. 32-33; 79-80). Craig Peterson saw the center pivot in the field 
adjacent to the home lot and observed where it crossed the SW corner of the home lot. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 80-82). 
The Petersons purchased the home lot and Lot 1 from the Gentillons. (Transcript, pp. 79-
80); (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). By warranty deed dated September 29, 2006 and recorded October 2, 
2006 as Instrument No. 572453 in the Recorder's Office for Bingham County, Idaho, the 
Gentillons conveyed to the Petersons all right, title and interest in and to the home lot and Lot 1. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 666); (Transcript, pp. 83-86); (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). 
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After receiving deed from the Gentillons, the Petersons learned that they did not have 
clear access rights to their property from the county road on the west. (Transcript, pp. 84-85; 87-
89). Upon questioning the Gentillons about access, the Gentillons agreed to specifically grant an 
access easement in accordance with their reservation of title to the access road. (Transcript, pp. 
84-85; 87-89). Accordingly, the walTanty deed from the Gentillons to the Petersons was 
amended to include an access easement and was re-recorded on March 30, 2007 as Instrument 
No. 579014 in the Recorder's Office for Bingham County, Idaho. (Transcript, pp. 84-85; 87-89); 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). 
HistOlY of the Current Dispute 
In early 2007 the Petersons were told by the Partnership that it claimed an interest in part 
of the home lot and Lot 1. (Transcript, pp. 93-98). The Petersons then caused a survey of the 
home lot and Lot 1 to be performed to determine the boundaries of their property. (Transcript, 
pp. 93-98). That survey did not reveal any interest, title, easement or encumbrance in favor of the 
Partnership. (Transcript, pp. 93-98). 
Based upon the survey, the Petersons filed this action to quiet title to the home lot, Lot 1, 
and their easement. (Transcript, pp. 93-98). 
After the initial trial, the Petersons hired Robert Butler to perform surveys for the purpose 
of obtaining legal descriptions in accordance with the court's findings and conclusions in order 
to prepare judgment and judicial deeds. (Transcript, pp. 401-421); (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 8, 9). 
Additionally, it was then determined that in the initial trial no party addressed the issue of the 
Respondents Brief - Page 10 
7246-PE [appeal] 
house straddling the boundary between the fannland and the home lot. (Transcript, pp. 399-403); 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits 8, 9). 
Butler prepared the necessary surveys to provide legal descriptions for the .34 acres 
quieted in the name of the Partnership together with the Partnership's easements for the pivot, 
mainline and access road, and the Petersons' easement on the access road. (Transcript, pp. 401-
421). Butler also prepared the survey for the .32 acres describing the garden spot. (Transcript, 
pp. 401-421); (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 8, 9). 
Course Of The Proceedings 
The Petersons filed a Complaint on September 10, 2007 alleging claims for quiet title, 
ejectment of the Pminership, trespass, and injunctive relief. (Clerk's Record, p. 15). The 
Partnership filed notice of appearance on October 5, 2007 followed by an Answer, Counterclaim, 
and Third-party Complaint filed on October 16,2007. (Clerk's Record, p. 22). 
Tracy Gentillon pro se filed an Answer to the Third-party Complaint on December 10, 
2007. Tracy Gentillon did not further participate in the action before the district court. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 44). 
Marcel Gentillon, Doris Gentillon and Scott Gentillon filed an Answer to the Third-party 
Complaint on January 7,2008. (Clerk's Record, p. 45). 
The Partnership filed on July 28, 2008 a motion with affidavits for partial summary 
judgment on the issue that its claims for breach of contract and specific perfonnance were barred 
by the statute oflimitations. (Clerk's Record, pp. 51 and 54). The Gentillons filed on September 
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18, 2008 a brief with affidavits in response to the Partnership's motion for summary judgment. 
(Clerk's Record, pp.l15 and 125). 
On August 22, 2008 the Petersons filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of bona fide purchasers for value. (Clerk's Record, pp. 80 and 85). The Partnership filed 
on September 18, 2008 a brief with affidavits in response to the Petersons' motion. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 129 and 155). 
On November 17,2008 hearing was held on the pending motions for summary judgment. 
The court denied the Petersons' motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Gentillons on the statute of limitations. (Clerk's Record, p. 170). 
The Partnership filed on December 8, 2008 a motion to amend its pleadings to raise a 
claim of resulting trust. (Clerk's Record, p. 205). 
On January 23, 2009 the district court entered its orders allowing the Partnership to 
amend its pleadings and denying the Petersons' motion for partial summary judgment. (Clerk's 
Record, p. 246). 
On July 31, 2009 the district court entered its order on the parties' motions for 
reconsideration. (Clerk's Record, p. 297). 
The Partnership filed its Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint on 
September 9, 2009. (Clerk's Record, p. 492). The Gentillons filed their Answer to the Amended 
Third-party Complaint on September 14, 2009. (Clerk's Record, p. 512). 
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The Gentillons filed on August 21, 2009 a motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
laches. (Clerk's Record, pp. 309 and 312). The Partnership filed its response in opposition on 
September 14,2009. 
The Petersons filed a motion for reconsideration on October 7, 2009. (Clerk's Record, p. 
547). The Partnership filed its response in opposition on October 8,2009. On October 16,2009 
the district court denied the Petersons' motion for reconsideration. (Clerk's Record, p. 558). 
Court trial was held October 20-21, 2009. Following submission of post trial proposed 
findings and briefing, the district cOUli entered its findings and conclusions on January 7, 2010. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 564). Judgment was entered on Aplil 12, 2010 with a revised judgment 
entered April 14, 2010. (Clerk's Record, pp. 587 and 594). 
The Partnership filed its motion to amend judgment on April 30, 2010. (Clerk's Record, 
p. 599). After hearing, the court denied the Partnership's motion on June 14, 2010. 
Following trial, it was discovered that the Gentillons' house on the Petersons' home lot 
straddled the boundary line between the home lot and the Partnership's farmland. On September 
13, 2010 the Petersons filed a motion for status conference. The Petersons filed a summary of 
issues remaining on October 21,2010. 
A status conference was held on October 25,2010. As a result of the status conference, 
the Petersons filed on October 28, 2010 a motion to amend their complaint to add supplemental 
claims concerning the issue of the house on the boundary line. (Clerk's Record, p. 602). On 
November 30, 2010 the district court entered its order granting the Petersons' motion to amend. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 617). 
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The Petersons' Amended Supplemental Complaint was considered filed effective 
November 30, 2010. The Partnership filed its Answer to the Supplemental Complaint on 
November 12, 2010. (Clerk's Record, p. 611). The Gentillons filed their Answer to the 
Supplemental Complaint together with their Supplemental Cross-claim against the Partnership. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 629). 
Court trial was held on the supplemental pleadings on December 23, 2010. Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Following Bench Trial was entered February 
10, 2011. (Clerk's Record, p. 666). Amended Final Judgment was entered February 22, 2011. 
(Clerk's Record, p. 678). 
On March 3, 2011 the Partnership filed its motion to amend the findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw. (Clerk's Record, p. 684). On March 7, 2011, the Petersons filed their motion 
for costs together with a memorandum of costs. (Clerk's Record, pp. 691 and 698). On March 8, 
2011, the Gentillons filed their motion for costs and fees together with a supporting 
memorandum. (Clerk's Record, pp. 719 and 722). 
The Partnership filed on March 9, 2011 a response in opposition to the Gentillons' 
motion for costs and fees. (Clerk's Record, p. 730). 
At the hearing on the motions for costs and fees held March 28, 2011, counsel for the 
Partnership voiced acceptance of the Petersons' survey costs. 
The district court entered on April 27, 2011 its Order on the motions for costs and fees, 
ruling that the Petersons' costs as a matter of right would be allowed and denying the Gentillons' 
motion for costs and fees. (Clerk's Record, p. 770). 
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Amended Judicial Deeds were filed May 12, 2011. (Clerk's Record, p. 778). 
On June 1,2011 the Partnership filed its motion for reconsideration of the order granting 
costs to the Petersons. (Included in Clerk's Record pursuant to lv10tion to Augment filed by the 
Partners hip). 
On June 20, 2011, the Peterson filed their response in opposition to the Partnership's 
motion. (Included in Clerk's Record pursuant to Motion to Augmentfiled by the Partnership). 
On July 19, 2011 the district court heard the Partnership's motion for reconsideration 
together with a motion to stay execution. (Included in Clerk's Record pursuant to Motion to 
Augmentfiled by the Partnership). On July 25,2011 the district court entered its order denying 
the Partnership's motion for reconsideration. (Included in Clerk's Record pursuant to Motion to 
Augmentfiled by the Partnership). 
Meanwhile, the Partnership had timely filed its initial notice of appeal on June 2, 2011. 
An amended notice of appeal was filed June 6, 2011. The Gentillons filed notice of cross appeal 
on June 30,2011. 
The Petersons filed a charge of contempt against the Partnership on July 1, 2011. 
(Included in Clerk's Record pursuant to Motion to Augment filed by the Partnership). On 
September 19, 2011 trial was held on the charge of contempt. (Included in Clerk's Record 
pursuant to Motion to Augment filed by the Partnership). By order dated September 26, 2011, 
the district court found against the Partnership in contempt on one charge of contempt, but did 
not find contempt had been committed on the other charges. (Included in Clerk's Record 
pursuant to Motion to Augment filed by the Partnership). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Petersons restate the issues on appeal as follows. 
1. Did the district court correctly determine as a matter of law that the 5-year statute 
oflimitations applied to bar the Partnership's contract claim for specific performance of the 1998 
Agreement? 
2. Are the district court's findings pertaining to the home lot and Lot 1 clearly 
erroneous? Are the district court's conclusions of law pertaining to the home lot and Lot 1 
correct and sustained by the facts as found? 
3. Are the district court's findings pertaining to the garden spot clearly erroneous? 
Are the district court's conclusions of law pertaining to the garden spot correct and sustained by 
the facts as found? 
4. Are the district court's findings pertaining to the Petersons' access easement 
clearly erroneous? Are the district court's conclusions of law pertaining to Petersons' access 
easement correct and sustained by the facts as found? 
5. Are the district court's findings pertaining to the Partnership's easements clearly 
erroneous? Are the district court's conclusions of law pertaining to Partnership's easements 
correct and sustained by the facts as found? 
6. Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding costs as a matter of right to 
the Petersons where the Partnership waived its objection to those costs? 
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7. Did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the Petersons' survey costs 
listed as costs as a matter of right where surveys were required to prepare judicial deeds and 
judgment in accordance with the court's findings and conclusions? 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District COUli correctly determined as a matter of law that the 5-year statute of 
limitations applied to bar the Partnership's contract claim for specific performance of the 1998 
Agreement. 
Standard of Review 
Interpretation of statute of limitation is a question of law over which an appellate court 
exercises free review. Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825, 979 P.2d 1183 (Idaho 1999). 
When reviewing a district court's summary judgment, the standard ofreview on appeal is 
the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. This Court exercises free review over 
questions oflaw. Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho 609,613,238 P.3d 209,213 (2010). 
There is no dispute that the Partnership's right to specific performance arises from the 
1998 Agreement. Nor is there any dispute that the 5-year statute oflimitations under I.C. § 5-216 
applies to the written 1998 Agreement. Finally, there is no factual dispute that the date the statute 
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of limitations commenced to run against the Partnership was sometime in 1999. Consequently, 
there is no basis to contest the district court's decision that more than five year had run from the 
accma1 ofthe Partnership's cause of action under the Agreement. 
All that remains is the Pminership's issue that an equitable right of specific perfonnance 
is not barred by statutes of limitation applicable to an underlying written contract. 
The Partnership's characterization of the 1998 Agreement as an executory contract is 
flawed. Full consideration and deeds were exchange in accordance with the Agreement in 
December 1998. The Palinership did not hold "equitable title" in the sense that it was still 
perfonning payment in order to receive deed. As set forth below, the Partnership's reliance on 
Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 (1871) is misplaced. The Partnership was never in possession of the 
acreages contemplated for exchange under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement. 
More important, the conditions subsequent are part of the written Agreement setting forth 
contract rights and not an executory contract where delivery of deed awaits the payment of the 
purchase price. See Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho 149,559 P.2d 765 (1977). 
Rather, the Palinership had a contract right to exchange deeds with the Gentillons based 
upon paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement contemplating potential adjustments to Lot 1 and an 
eastern portion of the fann1and. To accomplish those conditions subsequent to the 1998 
Agreement, a survey had to be perfonned for two purposes: 1) To detennine that portion of the 
SW comer of the horne lot necessary to allow movement of the pivot in a manner least disruptive 
to fanning practices; 2) Compute the fannab1e acreage in Lot 16 and compare that with the 
fannab1e acreage in Lot 1. 
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Upon making those determinations, the Pminership would exchange deeds with the 
Gentillons equalizing the acreage use in the horne lot for the pivot with acreage in the farmland 
to the east of the pivot. Finally, the southern boundary of Lot 1 would be adjusted north or south 
to accommodate any adjustment necessary to equalize farmable acreage. It is undisputed that the 
Partnership never attempted to fulfill those conditions subsequent. 
Contrary to the Partnership's argument, neither the 1998 Agreement nor the Gentillons 
ever contemplated that the southern 50 feet of the horne lot would be deeded to the Partnership. 
Thus, the only "executory" portion of the 1998 Agreement was the exchange of deeds 
based on the above noted adjustments. Performance of that executory portion depended upon the 
survey performed by Darren Leavitt in 1999. Once that survey was perfonned, the Partnership 
and the Gentillons were obliged to perform the remaining exchanges of deeds. No one 
performed. 
Furthermore, "when a contract is still executory, a party who is not in default, and who is 
ready, able and willing to perform may, by serving notice on the other party requiring him to 
perform within a reasonable time, make such performance a condition of his own further 
necessary performance." Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439, 443, 444 P.2d 132, 136 (1968). 
"Mutuality of obligation as pertains to an executory contract requires that each party to 
the agreement be bound to perform; if it appears that one party was never bound on his part to do 
the acts which form the consideration for the promise of the other, there is a lack of mutuality of 
obligations, and the other party is not bound." McCandless v. Schick, 85 Idaho 509, 518, 380 
P.2d 893, 898 (1963). 
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The Partnership was in default of the executory portions of the 1998 Agreement where it 
failed to use Leavitt's survey to make the adjustments required by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
Agreement. Such default prevents the Partnership from receiving equitable relief such as non-
application of statutes of limitation. Moreover, by its own inaction the Partnership was never 
bound to perform its obligations resulting in lack of mutuality of obligations. Therefore, the 
Gentillons were not bound to perform. 
Idaho recognizes the ancient maxim, "Equity considers as done that which ought to be 
done." McGill v. Lester, 108 Idaho 561, 700 P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1985); see also, Mochel v. 
Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468, 5 P.2d 549 (1930); Boyd v. Steele, 6 Idaho 625, 59 P. 21 (1899). 
Imposition of equitable relief requires a balancing of the equities of each party. O'Connor v. 
Harger Canst., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846 (2008). Balancing of equities is a question of 
fact for the trier of fact to determine. Id. 
Here, the district court determined the Partnership's breach of contract claims under the 
1998 Agreement were barred by statute of limitations. The Partnership did not do equity and 
therefore cannot obtain equity for specific performance of that contract. The district court 
correctly applied the statute oflimitations to the Partnership's claim for specific performance. 
B. The District Court's findings pertaining to the home lot and Lot 1 are not clearly 
erroneous and the conclusions of law peltaining to the home lot and Lot are correct and 
sustained by the facts as found. 
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Standard of Review 
Findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Chen v. 
Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1004, 829 P.2d 1349, 1353 (1992) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Where 
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence, they 
are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be disturbed by this COUli. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). This Court exercises free review over the district 
court's conclusions oflaw to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and 
whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 
265,269,985 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1999). 
An appellate court reviews the trial court's findings after a bench trial for clear error. 
I.R.C.P. 52(a). "A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on 
appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P .3d 876, 880 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Larsen, 
136 Idaho 402,405,34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001)). 
The Partnership has failed to demonstrate that the district court's findings pertaining to 
the Petersons' claim for quiet title to the horne lot and Lot 1 are clearly erroneous. The facts 
presented at the first trial established all elements under the Petersons' quiet title claim, subject 
only to the resulting trust claim of the Partnership to the SW comer of the horne lot for passage 
of the center pivot. 
In the Appellant's Brief, the Partnership contends the district court erred in refusing to 
grant the Partnership title to the southern 50 feet of the horne lot. The Partnership argues the 
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district court did not correctly interpret the Agreement. The Partnership admits in its brief that 
the Agreement is not ambiguous and, therefore, the enforcement of the Agreement is a question 
oflaw. (Appellant's Brief, p. 26). However, the Partnership failed to identify any portion of the 
Agreement addressing an adjustment to the southern 50 feet ofthe home lot. 
Instead, the facts as found by the trial court were that no adjustment to the southern 50 
feet of the home lot was necessary or required. The only adjustment required by the facts was to 
the SW comer of the home lot where the pivot arced. Those facts are not clearly erroneous. 
Based upon those facts, the district court correctly concluded that the Petersons' were 
entitled to judgment quieting title to the entire home lot less the SW .34 acres for the pivot. 
C. The District Court's findings pertaining to the garden spot are not clearly erroneous and 
the conclusions of law pertaining to the garden spot are correct and sustained by the facts as 
Standard of Review 
Findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Chen v. 
Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1004, 829 P.2d 1349, 1353 (1992) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Where 
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence, they 
are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be disturbed by this Court. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). This Court exercises free review over the district 
court's conclusions oflaw to detennine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and 
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whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. VVhittlesey, 133 Idaho 
265,269,985 P.2d 1127,1131 (1999). 
An appellate court reviews the trial court's findings after a bench trial for clear error. 
LR.C.P. 52(a). "A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on 
appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Larsen, 
136 Idaho 402, 405,34 P.3d 1085,1088 (2001)). 
At the initial trial and the supplemental trial, the uncontroverted facts established that the 
Partnership agreed to convey title to the garden spot to the Gentillons. Mont Gentillon's 
testimony confirmed the Partnership was not asserting title over the garden spot and intended to 
convey title to the garden spot to the Gentillons. Mont's testimony was corroborated by Darren 
Leavitt. 
The district court found that title to the garden spot should be quieted in the names of the 
Gentillons and, in tum, conveyed to the Petersons. Deed by estoppel is recognized in Idaho as a 
basis for granting title where there is no dispute that celiain land was to be conveyed to a party. 
Quirk v. Bedal, 42 Idaho 567, 248 P. 447 (1926). Once the Gentillons received title, the doctrine 
of after acquired title would work to the benefit of conveying title to the Petersons. I.e. § 55-605. 
Based upon those facts established at both trials, the district court correctly concluded 
that the Gentillons were entitled to judgment conveying to them title to garden spot and, 
resultantly, title would be conveyed to the Petersons. 
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D. The District Court's findings pertaining to the Petersons' access easement are not clearly 
erroneous and the conclusions of law pertaining to the Petersons' access easement are correct 
and sustained by the facts as found. 
Standard of Review 
Findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Chen v. 
Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1004, 829 P.2d 1349, 1353 (1992) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Where 
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence, they 
are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be disturbed by this Court. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). This Court exercises free review over the district 
court's conclusions oflaw to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and 
whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 
265,269,985 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1999). 
An appellate court reviews the trial court's findings after a bench trial for clear error. 
I.R.c.P. 52(a). "A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on 
appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Larsen, 
136 Idaho 402, 405, 34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001)). 
At issue is the meaning of the Gentillons' reservation of title to an access road when they 
conveyed to their son the farmland. The language of that reservation is as follows: 
Obviously, that language creates uncertainty as to the dimensions of the easement and its 
scope. Such uncertainty leads to ambiguity. 
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When the Gentillons initially conveyed title to the Petersons, they did not include any 
language granting an easement or right-of-way over the access road. After the Petersons learned 
of the access issue, they brought it to the attention of the Gentillons. In response, the Gentillons 
agreed to grant the Petersons a 30-foot wide easement along and across the Gentillons' reserved 
access road. 
In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek 
and give effect to the real intention of the parties. When an instrument conveying 
land is unambiguous, the intention of the parties can be settled as a matter of law 
using the plain language of the document. However, if the language of the deed is 
ambiguous, asceliaining the parties' intent is a question of fact and may therefore 
only be settled by a trier of fact. Ambiguity may be found where the language of 
the deed is subject to conflicting interpretations. The trier of fact must then 
detennine the intent of the parties according to the language of the conveyance 
and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 
*** 
Similarly, conflicting interpretations may arise when a phrase lends itself, without 
contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings .... [T]his Court detennined that 
the phrase "exclusively for their use" could be interpreted to mean (1) the grant of 
an easement right of way to the grantee, to the exclusion of all others, except the 
grantor; (2) the grant of an easement right of way excluding all others, including 
the grantor; or (3) as the grant of a fee simple estate to the brrantee. Likewise, in 
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 771,450 P.2d 9990,994 (1969), this Court 
detennined that the phrase "less a strip of land 30 feet wide off the East side for 
roadway" was ambiguous because it may have either expressed the intent to retain 
the fee to the strip in the grantor, or to create an easement for roadway over the 
strip in favor of the grantor. The Court found in that case that "inconsistencies in a 
deed may throw such a 'shadow of ambiguity' over the instrument as to warrant 
the introduction of parol evidence as an aid to discovering the intention of the 
parties." 
Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-405, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-1218 (2008) (most citations 
omitted). 
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The district court below was faced with a question concerning the grant of easement to 
the Petersons. Evidence was presented through the testimony of Marcel Gentillon establishing 
his intent concerning the dimensions of the easement and its scope. He testified that when he 
reserved title to the access road at the time he conveyed the farmland to his son, Scott, it was his 
intent that the reserved road would be 30-foot in width and for the purpose of ingress and egress 
for residential and farming demands. He further testified that he intended to grant the Petersons 
easement rights to the full width and scope of his access road. Marcel Gentillon's testimony was 
uncontroverted. The district court's findings of fact on the easement issue are not clearly 
erroneous. 
Based on the facts as found by the district court, its conclusion to quiet title to a 30-foot 
wide easement in favor ofthe Petersons was correct. 
Subsequent to the grant of easement, the Gentillons by quitclaim deed quitclaimed all of 
their right, title and interest in the access road to the Petersons. (Quitclaim Deed recorded July 
19,2010, as Instrument No. 619842 in the Recorder's Office for Bingham County, Idaho). 
The Petersons believe the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed by the Gentillons 
renders moot the easement issue. 
E. The District Court's findings pertaining to the Partnership's easements are not clearly 
erroneous and the conclusions of law pertaining to the Partnership's easements are correct and 
sustained by the facts as found. 
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Standard of Review 
Findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Chen v. 
Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1004, 829 P.2d 1349, 1353 (1992) (citing LR.C.P. 52(a)). Where 
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence, they 
are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be disturbed by this Court. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). This Court exercises free review over the district 
court's conclusions oflaw to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and 
whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 
265,269,985 P.2d 1127,1131 (1999). 
An appellate court reviews the trial court's findings after a bench trial for clear error. 
LR.C.P. 52(a). "A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on 
appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact." 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Larsen, 
136 Idaho 402, 405,34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001)). 
In considering the easements in favor of the Partnership, the facts relied upon by the 
district court included the existing express grant of a 30-foot wide access easement to the 
Partnership along the access road. That easement permitted the Partnership not only to have 
access, but also to have sufficient space to run its mainline along the road and maintain that 
mainline. 
Additionally, the district court determined the Partnership should have an easement to 
allow clear passage of its pivot across the SW corner of the home lot. Based upon the facts 
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presented at the trials, the court found that the Partnership should be granted title to the .34 acre 
portion of the SW comer allowing space for the last tower of the pivot to cross. Extending 
beyond the last tower was the continued irrigation line and end gun. To accommodate passage of 
the irrigation line and end gun, the district court granted an easement consistent with the end of 
the pivot as it crossed the SW comer of the home lot. 
The Partnership had asked for an easement to the reach of the casting of water by the 
pivot. That argument was rejected by the district court. 
Finally, consistent with the evidence, the district court determined that the easements in 
favor ofthe Partnership would not include farming within the easements. 
All of the district court's determinations are supported by facts. The decisions to grant 
easements and define the scope, dimensions and use of those easements is not only appropriate, 
but also mandatory. Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 925, 927, 557 P .2d 203, 205 (1976). 
F. The District COUli did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Petersons' costs as a 
matter of right where the Partnership waived its objection to those costs. 
Standard of Review 
The decision to award costs to the prevailing party in a civil action is within the sound 
discretion of the district court. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, inc., 132 Idaho 120, 127, 968 
P.2d 215, 222 (1998). In exercising its discretion, the district court must identify "which party to 
an action is a prevailing party." LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). 
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When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court conectly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower cOUli acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping 
Ctr., Inc. v.Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991). 
The district cOUli identified the Petersons as the prevailing party. There is no genuine 
argument on the exercise of the district court's discretion in identifying the prevailing party. 
The survey costs the Partnership now challenges on appeal related entirely to the 
expenses incuned in obtaining surveys of the various property locations for purposes of 
providing legal descriptions to be used in the court's judgment and judicial deeds. 
The Partnership did not file a written objection the Petersons' costs for the surveys. At 
the hearing on the Petersons' motion for costs, counsel for the Partnership acknowledged that 
such costs were appropriate and made no challenge to those costs. 
Idaho case law is well established on waiver of objections to costs. 
We need not address these arguments on their merits. We believe the district court 
conectly decided that the unions waived their right to object to inclusion of 
attorney fees in the memorandum of costs. LR.C.P. 54(d)(6), as amended in 1976, 
states: 
Any party may object to the claimed costs of another party set forth in a 
memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to 
disallow part or all of such costs within 10 days of service of the memorandum of 
cost. .. . Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall 
constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed. 
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The rule is designed to establish a deadline for infonning the court of any 
objection to items claimed in the memorandum of costs. It enables the trial court 
expeditiously to rule upon such objections and bring the case to a conclusion. In 
view of this purpose, we see no reason why there should be an exception to the 
waiver provisions for those items in the memorandum of costs which relate to 
attorney fees. We conclude the district court did not en in holding that the unions 
waived their objections to attorney fees in this case. 
Operating Engineers Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co. of Blackfoot, 104 Idaho 83, 85, 
656 P.2d 144, 146 (Ct.App. 1982) (emphasis added). 
An opposing party may object to a request for costs or attorney fees by filing a timely 
objection; however, it is well settled that where no objection to a memorandum of costs and 
attorney fees is filed, the right to further contest the award is waived. LR.C.P. 54(d)(6); Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 599-600, 990 P.2d 1204, 1210-11 (1999); Connor v. Dake, 
103 Idaho 761,761,653 P.2d 1173, 1173 (1982); Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945,949,908 P.2d 
1252, 1256 (Ct.App. 1995). 
In granting the Petersons' motion for costs, the district court recognized it was exercising 
its discretion. The district court considered the absence of any objection and the need for the 
surveys to complete the court's judgment and judicial deeds. There was no abuse of discretion. 
Furthennore, the district court could have awarded the same costs under LR.C.P. 
54( d)( 1 )(E). "[WJhere the decision of the lower court is based upon an erroneous theory, we will 
nonetheless uphold the decision if any alternative legal basis can be found to 
support it." Han/v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 1120 Idaho 364,370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991); See 
also Anderson & Naftiger v. G.T Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979). 
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Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion III awarding costs to the 
Petersons. 
G. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Petersons' survey costs as 
costs as a matter of right where surveys were required to prepare judicial deeds and judgment in 
accordance with the court's findings and conclusions. 
Standard of Review 
The decision to award costs to the prevailing party in a civil action is within the sound 
discretion of the district court. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 127, 968 
P.2d 215, 222 (1998). In exercising its discretion, the district court must identify "which party to 
an action is a prevailing party." LR.C.P. 54( d) (1 )(B). 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping 
Ctl'., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
To effectuate the district court's findings and conclusions, a judgment and judicial deeds 
were required defining the respective property interests. It is mandatory that all real property 
interests be accurately and completely defined in any judgment. Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 
925,927,557 P.2d 203, 205 (1976). 
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Where the surveys performed by Robert Butler were relied upon by the distIict court in 
entering its final amended judgment and judicial deeds, the costs for such surveys were 
appropriately assessed under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1). 
As discussed above, the district court exercised its discretion in making the determination 
of the prevailing party and awarding costs. The Palinership has failed to demonstrate any abuse 
of the district court's discretion. 
Further, the Partnership sought relief from the amended final judgment awarding costs. 
Again, in ruling on the Partnership's motion under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and 60(b), the district comi 
properly exercised its discretion and found no excusable neglect supporting the claim for relief. 
The district court properly exercised its discretion in awarding the survey costs. 
H. The Petersons are entitled to an award of costs on appeal. 
In accordance with LA.R. 41 and 35(b)(5), the Petersons requests on appeal an award of 
their costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's amended final judgment together with its concomitant judicial deeds 
should be affirnled. 
Dated this 2$ day of November 2011. 
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Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Respondents 
